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Abstract 
While European elections are often seen as remote from EU issues, considerations specifically linked to the EU came 
to the forefront in the wake of the 2014 European elections: the economic and financial crisis, the new process of 
designation of the European Commission President and the alleged increase of Eurosceptic votes. This increased 
salience of political debates about the EU asks for a reconsideration of the ‘second-order nature’ of European 
elections. In this context, as in 2009, the Belgian electorate voted for the regional and European levels on the very 
same day. Belgian voters were thus offered the opportunity to split their ticket between both levels. This allows 
comparing the occurrence and determinants of these ‘immediate switching’ behaviours in 2014 with those of the 
presumably less politicized EP elections in 2009. We do that by employing the 2009 and 2014 PartiRep Election 
Study data
1
. On the one hand, the article shows that split-ticket voting cannot be explained by economic voting, 
European identity and attitudes towards integration in 2014. On the other hand, the unique configuration of the 
Belgian elections enables us to observe that the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten did enhance split-ticket voting for 
voters who could directly vote for this candidate (in Flanders), while this did not increase split-ticket voting among 
voters who could only indirectly support the candidate (in Wallonia).  
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 We use the PartiRep Election Study 2009 and 2014. PartiRep is a network and a research project focusing on 
changing patterns of participation and representation in modern democracies. PartiRep is formally an Interuniversity 
Attraction Pole (IAP) funded by the Belgian Science Policy (Belspo). It involves the universities of Antwerp 
(Universiteit Antwerpen), Brussels (Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Université libre de Bruxelles), Leiden (Universiteit 
Leiden), Leuven (KU Leuven), Louvain-La-Neuve (Université Catholique de Louvain), and Mannheim (Universität 
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1. Introduction 1 
In multi-level political systems, voters are offered the opportunity to cast votes for several elections. These different 2 
contests are, however, not independent from each other. Sub-national and supra-national elections in Western 3 
European countries are bound to be tainted with national level considerations both in political campaigns and their 4 
electoral outcomes. If sub-national and supra-national elections have been introduced in an attempt to provide 5 
more legitimacy to these tiers of government, such legitimacy claims rest on the unproven assumption that voters 6 
vote according to level-specific motives. In the case of the European Union (EU), scholars have often shown that 7 
elections for the European Parliament (EP) are simply not about Europe (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Føllesdal & Hix, 2006). 8 
Due to low levels of politicization of European integration, EU issue voting is often considered, at best, a ‘sleeping 9 
giant’ (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004; de Vries, 2007). At the same time, however, the integration process has 10 
resulted in a shift of a broad range of competences to the supranational level. Few political domains are not affected 11 
by EU-level decision-making: Europe is nearly everywhere. This article aims to increase insights into the ways in 12 
which voters deal with this apparent paradox. What are EP elections about according to citizens? Are they about 13 
Europe at all? And if so, what specific EU issues are at stake?  14 
 15 
In Belgium, electoral results of the 2014 EP elections clearly differed from those of the 2009 elections (see Table 1). 16 
Differences in party choices, however, do not tell us how and why these elections were different from previous 17 
contests. To answer these questions, we should study vote motives.  18 
 19 
Table 1. Results of the 2009 and 2014 EP elections by region (%) 20 
  
 2009 2014 Difference 
Flanders    
CD&V 23.54 20.14 -3.40 
Groen 7.84 10.57 +2.73 
N-VA 9.71 26.91 +17.20 
Open VLD 20.02 19.92 -0.10 
PvdA+ 1.01 2.42 +1.41 
sp.a 13.60 13.24 -0.36 
Vlaams Belang 15.82 6.80 -9.02 
    
Wallonia    
cdH 13.42 11.65 -1.77 
Ecolo 22.00 10.90 -11.1 
FDF / 2.27 +2.27 
MR 24.78 27.44 +2.66 
PP / 6.64 +6.64 
PS 30.50 29.66 -0.84 
PTB-GO 1.19 5.68 +4.49 
    
Source: verkiezingen2014.be  
Notes: Percentages of vote share within each region are presented.  21 
 22 
Given the simultaneity of the two types of elections, both in 2009 and in 2014, this article studies split-ticket voting 23 
between European and regional elections. Split-ticket voting refers to voting for different parties for different offices 24 
which are being decided on a single election day. In 2014, the highest aggregate level effects of split-ticket voting 25 
between regional and EP elections were observed for the Open VLD (which scored 5.7 per cent higher in European 26 
elections), the N-VA (which scored 5.0 per cent lower in EP elections), the cdH (with a 3.5 per cent difference), and 27 
Ecolo (+2.3 per cent in EP elections). To understand the rationale of split-ticket voting, however, it is necessary to 28 
further explore its determinants at the individual-level.  29 
 30 
In this study, we use the Belgian case to examine motives of differentiated vote choices between European and 31 
other (here: regional) elections.  As in most of the EU (and especially Eurozone) member states, the economic and 32 
financial crisis was high on the political agenda in Belgium. Besides that, the Belgian case also provides a unique 33 
opportunity to test whether the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten had an effect on voting behaviours. Since the 34 
Dutch and French language communities in Belgium have separate party systems (Brack & Pilet, 2010), and as a 35 
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Spitzenkandidat was only running as a MEP candidate in the Dutch language community, we can test the effect of 36 
this new mechanism introduced in the 2014 EP elections in two different situations. Citizens of the Dutch language 37 
community could directly vote for this candidate, citizens of the French language community could only indirectly 38 
support this candidate. This peculiar situation is undoubtedly the main added value of the Belgian case to our 39 
attempt to explore new possible reasons for split-ticket voting in EP elections. It enables us to test to what extent 40 
the newly introduced electoral connection between EP elections and the designation of a new President of the 41 
European Commission, the ultimate attempt to introduce a ‘quasi-parliamentary system’ (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1532), 42 
has gained any consideration among those it was directed at: the European citizens.  43 
 44 
Thus, this article contributes to the debate of the (alleged) growing politicization of EU integration (de Wilde, 2011). 45 
It argues that because of the increased salience of European issues in the running-up to the 2014 elections (the 46 
economic and financial crisis, the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten and more generally the alleged ongoing 47 
politicization of EU integration), voters are expected to have based their vote more often on European-specific 48 
motives than on considerations related to national or regional politics. The legitimacy of different levels of 49 
government largely rests on the idea that voters vote according to level-specific considerations, mobilizing different 50 
vote motives for different contests. If this is the case, split-ticket voting in EP elections should increasingly be the 51 
result of EU-specific vote motives. Accordingly, this article tests whether reasons for split-ticket voting in 2014 52 
differed from reasons for split-ticket voting in 2009. 53 
2. Split-ticket voting: theory and hypotheses 54 
2.1. Explaining split-ticket voting 55 
Split-ticket voting has originally been examined in the American two-party system, where several ‘classical’ 56 
explanations for ticket-splitting have been put forward. Differentiated vote choices in concurrent elections can first 57 
and foremost be linked to the general trend toward candidate-centred politics. On the one hand, split-ticket voting 58 
has been seen as the result of specific trends of the party system such as declining party loyalty, the weakening of 59 
party apparatuses, media-centred campaigns or the surge in incumbents’ advantage (Wattenberg, 1991). On the 60 
other hand, funding, visibility or the quality of a candidate (and notably his/her political experience - Jacobson, 1990) 61 
can result in voting for a particular candidate, even though this candidate is part of a different party than the one 62 
usually supported by a given voter (Beck et al., 1992; Burden & Helmke, 2009; Burden & Kimball, 1998; Roscoe, 63 
2003). Hence, both features of the system and of particular candidates can lead to ‘candidate effects’ resulting in 64 
split-ticket voting. Another set of explanations more simply suggests that voters look for different things in different 65 
elections (Jacobson, 1990), hence expressing arena-specific votes. Party preferences would differ in the two arenas 66 
precisely because something else is at stake in the two different elections. Additional account of voters’ choices is 67 
offered by the policy-balancing model (Alessina & Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1992), whereby voters situated ‘in 68 
between’ two parties may choose to alternate in order to maximize their policy preferences overall.  69 
 70 
Ever since the first direct elections to the EP in 1979, major differences in voting behaviour between European and 71 
other - above all, national - elections have been pinpointed. They have nearly invariably been analysed through the 72 
prism of the ‘second-order’ model (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Although the model originally did not directly focus on 73 
split-ticket voting, it did put forward explanations related to divergent electoral outcomes in different electoral 74 
contests: European elections are marked by higher abstention levels, and better electoral results of small and 75 
opposition parties, as opposed to large and governmental ones. Why do voters vote differently in European 76 
elections? Voters are deemed to consider European elections as less important than first-order, national, elections 77 
and are expected to use these supra-national elections to express opinions about national-level issues (Reif, 1984; 78 
1985; Schmitt, 2005). It is assumed that domestic issues and not European ones dominate vote choices for European 79 
elections (Reif, 1984; 1985). This recognised absence of genuine European elections is one of the crucial elements of 80 
the endemic ‘EU democratic deficit’: “European Parliament elections are [not] really ‘European’ elections: they are 81 
not about the personalities and parties at the European level or the direction of the EU policy agenda” (Føllesdal & 82 
Hix, 2006: 535-536). Developments of the model have tried to understand how national issues are mobilised in EP 83 
votes and result in differentiated votes. They have highlighted specific voting behaviours such as ‘sanctioning the 84 
government’ (Hix & Marsh, 2007) or ‘sincere voting’ as opposed to the ‘useful’ votes expressed in national elections 85 
(Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010).  86 
 87 
The second-order model thus accounts for different electoral outcomes in different electoral contests, through 88 
national vote motives. At the same time, the literature has increasingly come to acknowledge that European 89 
elections are to some extent about Europe (de Vries & Tillman, 2011; Mattila, 2003; Schuck et al., 2011) and much 90 
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more so than they previously were (Hobolt et al., 2009). This apparent paradox can be solved by reconsidering the 91 
main assumption of the ‘second-order’ model which states that domestic issues dominate but do not necessarily 92 
monopolise the European electoral arena. The question hence becomes how different vote motives pertaining to 93 
different levels are articulated in explaining votes in European elections, compared to other (first order) elections.  94 
 95 
The Belgian case offers an opportunity to reconsider this model in instances of simultaneous elections. Based on the 96 
above presented literature on split-ticket voting and on the ‘second-order’ model, we assume that voters who vote 97 
differently in two (or more) concomitant contests use a specific reasoning when casting a vote for the ‘less 98 
important’ contest (here: European elections). We can thus put forward explanations of why certain voters choose 99 
to vote differently in EP elections than in more ‘first-order’ elections: national elections, which remain the major 100 
reference point, but also regional elections. Furthermore, a number of structural and contextual characteristics of 101 
the Belgian political system challenge some of the core features of the ‘second-order’ model, which makes the 102 
country a good case for studying whether the changed context in which the EP elections took place in 2009 and 2014 103 
affected split-ticket voting.  104 
 105 
First, regarding the structural characteristics of the system, while lower participation levels in European elections is 106 
one of the three main pillars on which the model is based, compulsory voting in Belgium annihilate most 107 
interpretations regarding participation pillars. Second, in multipolar systems like Belgium, a number of medium size 108 
parties enter electoral competition, blurring the differentiation between small and large organisations which 109 
constitute the first reference of the model in terms of vote transfers. Third, as a ‘consociation’ that consists of 110 
governments at various policy-levels, many parties usually take part in government at one level or the other. As a 111 
consequence, there is often no clear ‘alternation’ in power and the distinction between governmental and non-112 
governmental parties is curtailed. Accordingly, voting behaviours which rest on the assumption that voters have 113 
clear pictures of who governs and who is likely to govern such as ‘sanctioning the government’ or ‘tactical voting’ are 114 
less likely to occur. A final structural characteristic of the Belgian case is that as a federal state, the importance of the 115 
regions questions the originally admitted dichotomous distinction between national first-order elections and a 116 
second-order category encompassing all other contests. In fact, the degree of importance that voters attach to 117 
regional elections has been shown to vary with the distribution of competences between the central state and the 118 
regions (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004). The more competences are attributed to the regions, the more likely it is that 119 
regional elections will escape the logics of second-orderness (Jeffery & Hough, 2009). In federal or quasi-federal 120 
states, where regions exert a real legislative power, voters tend to give more consideration to their regional 121 
elections. These contests should be considered on a continuum as less of second-order or even more of ‘first order’ 122 
nature (Cutler, 2008; Jeffery & Hough, 2009; Van der Eijk et al., 1996). Belgium is precisely a highly decentralized 123 
federal state in which the regions (and communities) have been attributed extensive competences
2
. Its regional 124 
elections can hence be reasonably assumed to escape the ‘second-order’ ranking and the choice of voters is likely to 125 
be largely influenced by factors specific to regional politics. As such, regional considerations should be brought in as 126 
part of the (first order) explanation of ticket-splitting.  127 
 128 
Second, and turning to contextual features, the initial model has often carefully ignored instances of simultaneous 129 
elections, although later research has reincorporated them (Heath et al. 1999; Van Aelst & Lefevere 2012). Electoral 130 
cycles, however, are part and parcel of the model. The sanctioning effect is expected to be stronger when European 131 
elections act as ‘intermediary elections’ (Parodi, 1983) or as ‘mid-terms’ (as in the ‘punishment and protest’ 132 
explanation of Hix & Marsh, 2007). By contrast, sanctioning behaviour is expected to be weaker when EP elections 133 
are held closer to first-order ones - either directly after or just before - suggesting that there would be less vote-134 
switching or even bonuses for governing parties in such instances (Reif, 1985). In this regard, Belgian voters have 135 
been confronted with an extreme case of such closeness in 2014 but also 2009. In sum, with its consociational, 136 
federal and multi-party system, and taking into account the concomitance of elections, Belgium is clearly a ‘least 137 
likely case’ of voting behaviours in European elections dictated by the logics of the ‘second-order’ model. These 138 
characteristics theoretically limit sanctioning effect to a large extent, leaving the way for other – issue driven – vote 139 
motives. In the Belgian case it is more likely that a split vote is based on EU-specific considerations rather than on 140 
national considerations. If voters would take first-order preferences into account, they are expected to vote for the 141 
same party in both elections. 142 
                                                          
2 The Sixth State Reform has most recently (2011-2013) proceeded with a considerable transfer of competences and 
has given broad fiscal autonomy to the regions, largely resulting in moving the centre of gravity of public policies 
from the Federal Government to the federated entities (Sautois & Uyttendaele, 2013).  
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 143 
This article questions to what extent European elections are still of second-order by examining whether split-ticket 144 
voting can be at least partly and increasingly linked to EU-specific motives. Hobolt and her colleagues (2009) showed 145 
that voters might base their votes on both European and domestic issues. Hence, both vote motives are not 146 
mutually exclusive. In 2009, Van Aelst and Lefevere (2012) studied why people voted differently in the 2009 regional 147 
and European elections in Belgium. They showed that at least a part of the electorate was driven by Euro-specific 148 
motivations. Our study contributes to this debate by introducing a comparison between 2009 and 2014, hence 149 
allowing for a first appreciation of a possible evolution. Such evolution is expected for two main reasons: EU matters 150 
are increasingly salient and attitudes toward (especially against) current developments of the EU have gained 151 
considerable attention. Thus, we expect: 152 
H1: Motives of split-ticket voting are likely to differ between 2009 and 2014. In 2014, split-ticket motives 153 
were more likely to entail EU-specific considerations. 154 
2.2. Looking for EU-specific motives  155 
This article studies why voters split their ticket, examining the extent to which EU-specific motives can be part of the 156 
explanation of such behaviour in the context of what are usually considered as ‘second-order’ elections. This second 157 
section first puts forward EU arena-specific considerations before turning to candidate effects explanations. As such, 158 
we offer a continuation, a test and an addition to previous studies on voting behaviour in EP elections. Far from 159 
dismissing the ‘second-order’ model, we reassess it in lights of a ‘least likely case’. By reviewing EU-specific motives, 160 
this article tackles the question whether the increased salience of European issues in the running-up to the 2014 161 
elections due to the economic and financial crisis, the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten and thus the alleged 162 
ongoing politicization of EU integration influenced motives for split-ticket voting in EP elections. In these posited 163 
more politicized EP elections, voters are expected to have based their vote more often on European-specific motives 164 
than on considerations related to national or regional politics. 165 
2.2.1. Reincorporating arena-specific considerations 166 
EU-specific considerations can drive split-ticket voting. Carruba and Timpone, for instance, suggested that ‘Europe 167 
matters’ in the sense that voters actively express different preferences at the EU-level and at the national level 168 
(Carruba & Timpone, 2005, p. 279). They showed that voting for a green party at the European level could not be 169 
reduced to a vote for a small party or against the government (as argued in second-order elections theory). In the 170 
same vein, Hong recently demonstrated that European considerations matter in vote switching towards niche 171 
parties for European elections (Hong, 2015). ‘Europe’ would thus have become a subject-matter of its own, 172 
politicised and important enough to constitute a factor of voters’ decisions in elections (De Vries, Van der Brug & 173 
Van Egmond, 2011; De Vries & Tillman, 2011; Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011). In other words, Europe as an issue may 174 
constitute one motivational basis for choosing on a particular party. Reasonably, if European issues had played a role 175 
in voters’ decision, they would primarily have been expressed at that level, likely resulting in split-ticket voting.  176 
One factor possibly leading to an EU-specific vote in EP elections (and one that differs from one’s vote in other 177 
elections) is the strength of an individual’s European identity. The importance attributed to a specific ballot can be 178 
linked to perceptions of the institution, and specifically to how voters perceive the institution as legitimately 179 
representing them (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). As citizens with a stronger European identity feel part of the 180 
community that is (aimed to be) represented by the EP, citizens with a stronger European identity are expected to 181 
attach more importance to EP elections (Verhaegen, 2015). As a result, voters with a stronger European identity are 182 
expected to more often also specifically think about their policy preferences for the EU community they are part of 183 
when casting their vote in EP elections. Another EU-related reason to vote differently in EP elections than in other 184 
elections is attitudes about EU integration. A considerable amount of recent studies suggests that EU attitudes 185 
increasingly affect party choice in EP elections (Evans, 1998, 2002; de Vries, 2007, 2009, 2010; de Vries et al., 2011; 186 
Hobolt et al., 2009). Eurosceptic votes linked to worries about the effects of EU policy and dissatisfaction with 187 
mainstream politics lie at the heart of Eurosceptic parties’ success (Treib, 2014). In a context characterized by 188 
greater politicization, it is more likely that attitudes towards the EU influence electoral decisions. This process where 189 
the EU has become an issue in itself is referred to as ‘EU issue voting’ by de Vries (2007). Hence, it seems logical to 190 
assume that split-ticket voters may be turning to other parties in EP elections out of a positive or negative general 191 
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attitude towards the EU
3
. As such, ticket-splitting could be attributed to various attitudes of the electorate towards 192 
different contests that are held simultaneously but can be attributed to different motives, much in line with the 193 
arena-specific vote motives argument (Jacobson, 1990).  194 
Besides these diffuse factors of identity and attitudes about EU integration, policy-issues may also lead to an EU-195 
specific vote. By 2014, some policy areas such as the economic and monetary union, security, migration or the 196 
environment gained unprecedented salience. Kriesi and Grande (2015) showed that events such as the Greek crisis 197 
and bailout, the Irish bailout and the fiscal compact translated into an increased salience of the EU in media 198 
coverage and in the public debate. Hobolt and Tilley (2014) also established that this increased salience of the euro 199 
crisis translated into an increased awareness among citizens about the euro crisis. Citizens even tended to perceive 200 
the EU as responsible for the economic situation in their country, rather than seeing this as a responsibility of the 201 
national government. To this regard, a particularly prolific theory, economic voting
4
, is precisely concerned with the 202 
impact of economic perceptions or situations on the probability of voting for incumbents or for any other party 203 
(Duch & Stevenson, 2006). The economic voting phenomenon has indeed often been studied through the vote 204 
function (Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000), which refers to the evolution of the vote for incumbents or 205 
for other parties and entails both economic and political variables as explanations of vote choices (Nannestad & 206 
Paldam, 1994). Applying economic voting to European elections entails that voters who associate economic matters 207 
with the EU are expected to vote for European elections based on economic considerations since they perceive the 208 
EU-level as particularly relevant on these matters. This may lead to voting for a different party in EP elections than in 209 
national or regional elections as the consideration about the economy is in that case made specifically about the EU-210 
level.  211 
Overall, we argue that especially for the 2014 EP elections, a number of EU arena-specific considerations are 212 
potential explanations of split-ticket voting. Thus, motives related to the EU or European politics are expected to 213 
increase the likelihood of voting differently in regional and EP elections in Belgium (Van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012: 6). 214 
More precisely, we expect that:  215 
H2a: Voters with a stronger European identity are more likely to split their ticket, especially in 2014. 216 
H2b: Voters with more positive attitudes about EU integration are more likely to split their ticket, especially 217 
in 2014. 218 
H2c: Voters who grant more importance to the economy are more likely to split their ticket, especially in 219 
2014.  220 
 221 
We will further explain and explore these relationships in the third part of the article.  222 
2.2.2. Candidate effects 223 
A number of authors have argued that limited levels of candidate voting in EP elections contribute to the absence of 224 
genuinely ‘European’ elections (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006). In 2014, however, the first application of a provision 225 
enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon has brought expectations of change in this regard. As of 2014, the elections of the 226 
EP should be taken into account by the European Council in the designation of the President of the European 227 
Commission (art.17 TEU). The interpretation put forward by the European Parliament is that the President of the 228 
Commission is to come from the party group that received the largest vote share in the European elections, urging 229 
political parties at European level (the so-called Europarties) to designate their ‘lead candidate’
5
. The Europarties 230 
and the Parliament advertised that a vote for a particular party in the EP elections implies a vote for the ‘lead 231 
candidate’ or ‘Spitzenkandidat’ of the corresponding Europarty. Hobolt (2014) observed that the awareness about 232 
                                                          
3
 Note that the literature has underlined the need to consider citizens who are neither Europhile nor Eurosceptic as 
well (de Vries, 2013; Duchesne et al. 2013; Rose & Borz, 2015; Stoeckel, 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2012, 2014). Citizens 
that are indifferent and/or ambivalent towards European integration could be expected either to be more volatile 
and split their ticket or not to participate (the latter not really applying in Belgium due to compulsory voting). 
However, we lack indicators as questions measuring indifference and ambivalence were not included in both 
surveys.  
4
 For literature reviews of economic voting theory see, among others:  Lewis-Beck (1988), Norpoth et al. (1991), 
Norussen & Taylor (2003). 
5
 European Parliament, Resolution of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 
(2012/2829(RSP)). 
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this electoral connection between a vote for the EP and the selection of a new President of the European 233 
Commission differed between member states where voters could directly vote for such a candidate (i.e. where a 234 
‘lead candidate’ of a given Europarty was also a candidate to the EP for a national party) and member states where 235 
only the mechanism of indirect support for a candidate was possible.  236 
 237 
In Belgium, although Guy Verhofstadt was known as former Prime Minister in 2009, we can assume that his visibility 238 
– at least partly attributable to his role as group President of the ALDE – in the past EP legislature (2009-2014) has 239 
established him as a major European figure. Switching to Verhofstadt would hence be in line with the ‘candidate-240 
effect’ identified by the split-ticket voting literature. Although we cannot clearly establish whether voting for him is 241 
based on clear ‘European motives’ or tainted with considerations about the role of Belgium in Europe if Verhofstadt 242 
would become the President of the Commission (which would amount to a kind of strategic voting), both 243 
possibilities are linked to European considerations. In the Dutch-speaking community in Belgium, the candidate of 244 
the ALDE party for the Commission Presidency was on the Open VLD list. Thus, Verhofstadt’s candidacy for President 245 
of the Commission is expected to have a (candidacy) effect on split-ticket voting. Following the literature on 246 
candidacy effects, it can be expected that Verhofstadt’s candidacy encouraged part of the Flemish voters to vote for 247 
Open VLD and specifically to vote for Verhofstadt in EP elections, even if they voted for a different party in regional 248 
elections. In the French language community, voters who want to support Verhofstadt’s candidacy for President of 249 
the Commission can be expected to vote for MR as this indirectly supports the candidacy of Verhofstadt (MR is also 250 
part of the ALDE europarty). According to this reasoning, voters who turned to Open VLD or MR in the 2014 EP 251 
elections were more likely to do so for EU-specific motives and more precisely for a specific ‘European’ candidate. 252 
Because of this, we expect that: 253 
 254 
H3a: Voting for Open VLD or MR in EP elections more often led to a split-ticket vote. 255 
H3b: Voting for Verhofstadt in EP elections more often led to a split-ticket vote among voters of the Dutch 256 
language community. 257 
3. Data and methods 258 
The data of the PartiRep Elections Study 2009 and 2014 are used in this article as they allow for comparing 259 
explanations for split-ticket voting between the two most recent EP elections. In these studies, a geographically 260 
stratified random sample of eligible voters in Flanders and Wallonia was drawn from the national registry. The 2009 261 
study was carried out in three waves, two before and one after the elections of the 7th of June 2009. The 2014 study 262 
was carried out in two waves, one before and one after the elections of the 25th of May 2014. Different respondents 263 
participated in the 2009 and the 2014 study. While a short panel study was carried out in both election years, it has 264 
to be noted that we do not use panel data from 2009 to 2014. In the first wave of each study respondents were 265 
interviewed face-to-face about their personal background, opinions, interests, political activities and voting 266 
behaviour. In the other survey waves the respondents were interviewed by phone about the votes they casted, their 267 
vote motives and the election campaign. In 2009 the first interview was completed by 2,331 respondents (1,204 268 
Flemish and 1,127 Walloon), 1,845 respondents completed the survey in the second wave and 1,698 respondents 269 
also completed the third survey. In 2014 the interview was completed by 2,019 respondents (1,008 Flemish and 270 
1,011 Walloon), which accounts for an acceptable response rate of 45 per cent. In the second wave 1,470 271 
respondents completed the survey. To account for disproportionate non-response according to age, gender and 272 
education level, weights are used throughout the analyses. Indicators for the concepts of interest in this research 273 
(European vote motives, economic vote motives, and information on voting for a Spitzenkandidat) are included in 274 
the data. 275 
In both studies, respondents were asked which topic they find most important to take into account when deciding 276 
upon their vote. In the 2009 study ‘the financial crisis’ was in the list of options. In 2014 ‘economics’ was included as 277 
an option. These questions are used as measures for economic motives for split-ticket voting. As measures for 278 
European vote motives, attitudes about EU integration and European identity are included. Attitudes about EU 279 
integration are measured on a scale from 0 to 10 whereby ‘0’ means respondents think that European integration 280 
already went too far, ‘5’ that it is fine as it is, and ‘10’ that they would like the EU to further integrate. European 281 
identity is measured by asking respondents to which geographic or cultural community they feel they belong to in 282 
the first place and in the second place. A dummy variable is constructed with the respondents who opted for Europe 283 
in the first place or in the second place receiving code ‘1’, and respondents that did not choose Europe receiving 284 
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code ‘0’
6
. Voters with a stronger European identity are expected to attach more importance to EP elections (Bruter, 285 
2008; Ehin, 2008; Verhaegen, 2015). As a result, they are expected to invest more consideration in their vote for the 286 
EP, which is more likely to result in a split-ticket vote based on EU vote motives. Voters with a strong regional 287 
identity, to the contrary, might focus on regional elections and just follow the same line in EP elections, which they 288 
perceive as less important than voters with a strong European identity are expected to do. Also regional identity is 289 
included as a dummy variable (using the same survey questions about feeling of belonging to particular geographic 290 
and cultural communities) to set the effect of European identity against the potential effect of regional identity. The 291 
hypothesized effect of the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten requires an extra test of the effect of voting for a 292 
specific candidate. To examine the effect on split-ticket voting of the fact that former Belgian Prime Minister Guy 293 
Verhofstadt was running as Spitzenkandidat for the ALDE, we tested whether respondents who voted for a liberal 294 
party (Open VLD among Flemish respondents and MR among Walloon respondents) were more likely to have also 295 
split their ticket. Also, in 2014 we assessed whether the candidate effect (if any) in Flanders can be explained by 296 
specifically voting for Verhofstadt. 297 
We also introduced other variables in order to check for alternative explanations of split-ticket voting. A first 298 
alternative explanation is uncertainty of party preference or of allegiance. It is expected that when voters like 299 
multiple parties or are not strongly attached to just one party, they might vote for different parties in different 300 
elections (here: regional and European) in order to express their support for different parties. This is also seen as 301 
‘balancing’ between different preferences and positions (Giebler & Wagner, 2015). On the one hand, this can be 302 
measured by vote switching between the election that took place during the study and the most recent previous 303 
election. On the other hand, an indicator is included that displays whether the vote intention of the respondent in 304 
the first wave of the study matches the vote in the election. A comparison is made with the actual vote in the 305 
regional election of 2009 and 2014 respectively because the questions about the vote choice in the most recent 306 
previous election and about vote intention were measured for regional and federal elections only, which are 307 
theoretically of or closer to first-order classification. This information is not available for voting in EP elections. A 308 
second alternative explanation for split-ticket voting is voting for a specific candidate, rather than for a party. The 309 
specific characteristics of a candidate might attract support of a voter, quasi-independently from which party the 310 
candidate is attached to. This might lead to split-ticket voting as the party of the candidate is seen as of little 311 
importance. In the 2009 study, respondents were asked about their vote motives for EP elections in an open 312 
question. We use the coding of Van Aelst and Lefevere (2012) who attributed the code ‘1’ to respondents who 313 
referred to a specific candidate in their vote motive. Respondents who did not mention a candidate or candidates 314 
received the code ‘0’. In the 2014 study, respondents were directly asked whether they voted for the party in 315 
general, or for a specific candidate (or multiple candidates). A dummy variable is constructed where voting for a 316 
candidate received ‘1’.  317 
Finally, control variables are included in the analyses. Education level is included as individual resources such as 318 
education level influences political sophistication. Similarly, political interest and political knowledge are related to 319 
political sophistication. More sophisticated reasoning that combines different vote motives and strategies may drive 320 
split-ticket voting. Also citizens with a higher educational level, who know more about politics and who are more 321 
interested in politics, are more likely to be in favour of EU integration and have a stronger European identity 322 
(Fligstein, 2008; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Political sophistication could thus potentially moderate the 323 
relationship between attitudes about and identifications with the EU and split-ticket voting. Furthermore, controls 324 
are included for age, gender and political trust. Political trust in national institutions might increase or decrease the 325 
odds of ticket-splitting as we have seen that EP vote can be used to support or sanction the (parties in) government. 326 
Citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes towards domestic politics in their attitudes towards European integration 327 
(Anderson, 1998; Duchesne et al., 2013). Moreover citizens who have more trust in political institutions tend to 328 
identify more strongly as European (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Trust in political institutions could thus moderate 329 
the relationship between EU-specific vote motives and split-ticket voting as well. 330 
4. Analyses 331 
                                                          
6
 As a robustness test, we replicated the analysis of the 2014 data with a more elaborate measure of European 
identity. This analysis led to the same result as when using the binary variable: European identity is not significantly 
related to split-ticket voting. 
 Politics and Governance, Year, Volume X, Issue X, Pages X–X 9 
Table 2 presents the proportion of the respondents in the PartiRep Election Studies of 2009 and 2014 that split their 332 
ticket between regional and EP elections. In both election years, a large majority of citizens voted for the same party 333 
in regional and in EP elections.  334 
Table 2. Regional-European split-ticket voting in 2009 and 2014 in Flanders and Wallonia  335 
 2009 2014 
 %  N  % N  
Flanders 22.76% 201/883 28.99% 225/776 
Wallonia 18.59% 134/721 26.94% 167/620 
Source: PartiRep Election Study 2009, 2014. 336 
Notes: Percentages of split-ticket voting are presented. This is the proportion of respondents that voted for a 337 
different party in the EP elections than in the regional elections.  338 
Even though 18.59 to 28.99 per cent of the respondents split their ticket, it is more likely that one voted for the 339 
same party in both elections. It can also be observed that in both election years, Flemish voters were more likely to 340 
split their ticket than Walloon voters. Finally, we see that both in Flanders and in Wallonia more respondents split 341 
their ticket in 2014 than in 2009. Different vote motives might have inspired voters in 2014 and in 2009. This is in 342 
line with our first hypothesis.  343 
In order to test whether split-ticket voting could be explained by different factors in 2014 than in 2009, multivariate 344 
logistic regressions will be carried out for both elections, including the same explanatory and control variables. The 345 
significance of the explanatory variables will be compared between both models. The analyses are carried out for 346 
Wallonia and Flanders separately as each region has a separate party system. 347 
4.1. Explaining split-ticket voting between regional and European levels: comparing 2009 and 2014 ballots 348 
The multivariate logistic analyses that include all explanatory and control variables are presented in Table 3. Similar 349 
(coded 0) or dissimilar (coded 1) party choices in regional and European elections as reported by the respondents 350 
are used as the dependent variable. These analyses show that not all bivariate relationships are robust when 351 
including control variables and alternative explanations. In the 2009 study in the Flemish sample, European identity 352 
and attitudes about EU integration show significant coefficients. In 2014, however, there is no significant 353 
relationship between European identity or support for EU integration and split-ticket voting in Flanders. Rather, 354 
uncertainty (i.e. changing party preference between the 2014 regional elections and the previous elections, and 355 
changing party preference between the 2014 regional elections and the first 2014 survey wave) and voting for a 356 
specific candidate in EP elections show to be consistent explanations for split-ticket voting in both 2009 and 2014 in 357 
Flanders. In the Walloon sample, part of the variation in split-ticket voting in 2009 can be explained by uncertainty of 358 
party preference exemplified by intra-campaign vote switching (between the first and the last survey wave of the 359 
2009 Study). Also, respondents who voted for a specific candidate in the 2009 EP elections were more likely to split 360 
their ticket. In 2014, the variance in split-ticket voting among Walloon respondents can be explained by both inter-361 
campaign vote switching (between the 2007 and 2009 elections) and by intra-campaign vote switching. Voting for a 362 
specific candidate is not significantly related to split-ticket voting in Wallonia in 2014. Finally, voters who considered 363 
the economy as the most important issue when voting are not more likely to have split their ticket. All in all, our 364 
second set of hypotheses is largely invalidated. 365 
 366 
Table 3. Explaining split-ticket voting between regional and EP elections in Flanders and Wallonia in 2009 and 
2014 
 Model I 
Flanders 2009 
Model II 
Flanders 2014 
Model III 
Wallonia 2009 
Model IV 
Wallonia 2014 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Economic vote motive     
Economy/financial 
crisis most important 
issue to decide vote 
0.030 (0.242) 0.344 (0.256) 0.094 (0.278) 0.748 (0.383) 
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EU-specific vote 
motives 
    
European identity 0.743 (0.274)** 0.309 (0.310) 0.494 (0.329) 0.596 (0.472) 
Regional identity 0.360 (0.255) 0.154 (0.284) 0.393 (0.318) 0.204 (0.426) 
Attitude about EU 
integration (higher 
score is more positive 
towards further 
integration) 
-0.117 (0.049)* 0.026 (0.050) 0.048 (0.056) 0.010 (0.066) 
Alternative 
explanations 
    
Change vote between 
elections
 
0.898 (0.242)*** 0.869 (0.268)** 0.528 (0.282) 1.129 (0.462) * 
Change party 
preference between 
survey waves
+ 
1.733 (0.246)*** 1.362 (0.281)*** 1.824 (0.297)*** 1.575 (0.432)*** 
Vote for candidate 
(vote for list is ref.) 
1.429 (0.229)*** 0.751 (0.245)** 1.006 (0.346)** -0.059 (0.340) 
Political trust (national 
institutions) 
-0.062 (0.078) 0.019 (0.085) 0.018 (0.095) 0.049 (0.109) 
Control variables     
Age 0.002 (0.008) -0.015 (0.007)* -0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.011) 
Female -0.245 (0.233) -0.519 (0.275) -0.321 (0.279) 0.091 (0.343) 
Education (low is ref.)     
Middle 0.372 (0.318) 0.470 (0.325) 0.403 (0.377) -0.600 (0.485) 
High 1.020 (0.341)** 0.418 (0.333) 0.460 (0.379) 0.254 (0.439) 
Political interest 0.021 (0.053) -0.056 (0.059) -0.024 (0.068) -0.059 (0.063) 
Political knowledge 0.202 (0.085)* -0.080 (0.441) -0.053 (0.098) 0.065 (0.607) 
Intercept -3.410 (0.662)*** -1.945 (0.726) -3.389 (0.713)*** -2.855 (0.908)** 
N 661 439 487 326 
Pseudo-R² 23,47% 17,38% 19,32% 19,84% 
Source: PartiRep Election Study 2009 and PartiRep Election Study 2014. 
Notes: Logistic regression with split-ticket voting as dependent variable. The results are weighted for age, 
gender and education level. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
+ 
In 2009 respondents’ vote in the regional 
elections is compared to their preference for the regional elections in the first wave; in 2014 party preference 
is not asked for the regional elections in wave 1, so the actual vote in the 2014 regional elections is compared 
to respondents’ preference for the federal elections in wave 1. 
4.2. A Verhofstadt Effect in 2014? 367 
Five major Europarties designated candidates for the European Commission Presidency ahead of the European 368 
elections. One of them - the candidate of the ALDE - was the former Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt. A 369 
direct effect of his candidacy could be expected in Flanders where voters could directly vote for him, and an indirect 370 
effect in Wallonia where only the mechanism of indirect support could be at play through a vote for the MR 371 
(Mouvement Réformateur) party. Indeed, in Flanders, many respondents of our pool voted for Open VLD for the 372 
European elections even when they voted for a different party in the 2014 regional elections, thereby increasing the 373 
declared vote for this party of 5.4 per cent between regional and European elections. Thus, 16 per cent of the N-VA 374 
electorate, 11.6 per cent of CD&V voters, 9.8 per cent of Sp.a voters, 12 per cent of the Groen electorate and 13.8 375 
per cent of Vlaams Belang voters at regional elections split their vote, throwing their support at Open VLD at the 376 
European level. In Wallonia, the MR records similar results for both elections, respectively 26.7 per cent and 27.4 per 377 
cent in regional and European ballots. In this last section, we test if the running of former Belgian Prime Minister 378 
Guy Verhofstadt as Spitzenkandidat had an effect on split-ticket voting toward a candidate in 2014. 379 
 380 
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First, we observe no substantial difference when comparing percentages of respondents who declare to have voted 381 
for a specific candidate between Flanders (43.5 per cent) and Wallonia (43.8 per cent). Yet, voters mentioning voting 382 
for a specific candidate in EP elections (that is, casting one or multiple preference vote(s) rather than a vote for the 383 
entire list) were more likely to split their ticket in Flanders (34.3 per cent) than in Wallonia (24.3 per cent). Taking a 384 
closer look at who were the specific candidates the respondents casted their vote for, we observe that in Flanders 385 
Guy Verhofstadt comes first with 32.5 per cent. In Wallonia, Louis Michel gathers 20.3 per cent. The descriptive 386 
results for the top three of specific candidates in Flanders and in Wallonia is presented in Table 4. 387 
 388 
More importantly, in Flanders, the respondents who declare to have voted for the former Prime Minister were more 389 
inclined to split their ticket between regional and European elections as 55.8 per cent of those who gave their vote 390 
to Verhofstadt in the EP elections did not vote for Open VLD in regional elections. The fact that other popular 391 
politicians such as Louis Michel (MR), Marianne Thyssen (CD&V) or Marie Arena (PS) were less able to attract split-392 
ticket voters is already an indication of what could be called a ‘Verhofstadt effect’ confirming hypotheses 3a and 3b. 393 
In sum, it seems that voting in for Verhofstadt EP elections helps to explain split-ticket voting. In the next section we 394 
test whether this relationship is robust when including control variables and alternatives explanations. 395 
  396 
Table 4. Top three of specific candidates mentioned by the respondents in Flanders and Wallonia in EP elections 397 
(first mentioned, N=551) 398 
 
Electoral results in 2014 
 
PartiRep 2014 
Survey 
 
 Preference votes+ 
Percentage 
of voters 
Split-ticket 
voters 
(per cent) 
N 
Flanders     
VERHOFSTADT Guy (Open VLD) 531.030 32.5 55.8 104 
THYSSEN Marianne (CD&V) 340.026 15.0 27.1 48 
VAN OVERTVELDT Johan (N-VA) 274.444 11.6 5.4 37 
Respondents declaring voting for a specific 
candidate 
 
 34.3 320 
Wallonia     
MICHEL Louis (MR) 264.550 20.3 25.5 47 
ARENA Marie (PS) 186.103 13.9 6.3 32 
ROLIN Claude (CDH) 75.521 10.0 21.7 23 
Respondents declaring voting for a specific 
candidate 
 
 24.3 231 
Source: PartiRep Election Study 2014. 399 
Notes: Percentages of respondents mentioning specific candidates for those who declared a vote for a candidate 400 
and percentages of those mentioned one of the top three most-mentioned candidates that are split-ticket voters. + 401 
These data were computed by J. Dodeigne (Dodeigne, 2015).  402 
 403 
In order to scrutinize the direct impact of the presence of a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ on the European list in Flanders and to 404 
test for an indirect effect in Wallonia, we use a multivariate analysis again that combines the economic voting 405 
motives, the EU-specific vote motives and alternative classical explanations. We also add indicators capturing a 406 
‘Spitzenkandidat’ effect. Again, we use binary regression models to predict split-ticket voting (1) or straight-ticket 407 
voting (0). In a first step, we estimate two models, one for each region, which includes a dummy variable voting for 408 
Open VLD in EP elections or voting for MR in EP elections. This variable accounts for the fact that a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ 409 
effect could have played a role in leading more voters to turn to Open VLD and to its French-speaking counterpart, in 410 
order to support the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt in the race for the Commission Presidency. Indeed, the Belgian 411 
electorate was at least – partly – aware of his candidacy to the Presidency of the Commission. In the AECR-412 
commissioned survey, 71 percent declared to be aware of the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt when aided to answer 413 
the question (AECR, 2014). Voters aware of his candidacy and willing to support it should have logically privileged 414 
the national parties that stand for the ALDE – in Flanders, Open VLD and in Wallonia, indirectly through the MR.  415 
 416 
Models V and VI confirm earlier presented results when introducing voting for Open VLD/MR in the models. In 2014, 417 
in both regions, neither economic vote motive nor EU-specific vote motives do significantly affect the odds of casting 418 
a split-ticket vote between regional and European ballots. The variances in split-ticket voting among respondents are 419 
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related to both inter-elections vote switching and intra-campaign vote switching. More importantly, in Flanders, 420 
once we introduce voting for Open VLD, voting for a specific candidate rather than for a list does not significantly 421 
explain the probability of ticket-splitting any more. In other words, split-ticket voting can be significantly explained 422 
by voting for Open VLD at the European level. Respondents who voted for Open VLD in EP elections often voted for 423 
a different party in Regional elections. In Wallonia, we do not find any trace of an indirect mechanism of support for 424 
the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt as a Spitzenkandidat through a vote for the MR.  425 
 426 
In Model VII, we add a dummy variable to account for the declared vote for Guy Verhofstadt (1) or for (an)other 427 
candidate(s) (0) in Flanders. This last model hence verifies whether there was a ‘Verhofstadt effect’ on split-ticket 428 
voting in Flanders, even when controlling for the other identified motives of split-ticket voting. Declaring to have 429 
voted for Guy Verhofstadt is found to be a crucial explanation for split-ticket voting in Flanders in 2014. Also in this 430 
case, the effect of voting for a specific candidate in EP elections disappears at the expense of a strong and highly 431 
significant effect of voting for Verhofstadt. This result suggests that Flemish citizens who split their ticket did so in 432 
part because they specifically wanted to vote for Verhofstadt and possibly support his candidacy as Spitzenkandidat. 433 
This supports hypotheses 3a and 3b.  434 
 435 
Table 5. ‘Spitzenkandidat effect’ on split-ticket voting between regional and EP elections in Flanders and Wallonia in 436 
2014 437 
 Model V 
Flanders 2014 
Model VI 
Wallonia 2014 
Model VII 
Flanders 2014 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Economic vote motive    
Economy/financial crisis most important 
issue to decide vote 
0.185 (0.261) 0.719 (0.392) 0.196 (0.264) 
EU-specific vote motives    
European identity 0.447 (0.314) 0.588 (0.473) 0.367 (0.312) 
Regional identity 0.302 (0.297) 0.209 (0.425) 0.393 (0.318) 
Attitude about EU integration  
(higher score is more positive towards 
further integration) 
0.021 (0.052) 0.010 (0.066) 0.035 (0.052) 
‘Spitzenkandidat’ effect    
Vote for candidate 0.462 (0.263) -0.069 (0.341) .224 (0.286) 
Vote for Open-VLD/MR 1.128 (0.292)*** 0.179 (0.371)  
Vote for Verhofstadt   1.306 (0.337)*** 
Alternative explanations    
Change vote between elections
 
0.829 (0.274)** 1.118 (0.463)* 0.843 (0.275)** 
Change party preference between survey 
waves
+ 
1.315 (0.289)*** 1.594 (0.438)*** 1.344 (0.288)*** 
Political trust (national institutions) 0.039 (0.090) 0.054 (0.110) 0.014 (0.090) 
Control variables    
Age -0.011 (0.008) -0.001 (0.011) -0.111 (0.008) 
Female -0.534 (0.285) 0.102 (0.347) -0.443 (0.282) 
Education (low is ref.)    
Middle 0.599 (0.343) -0.642 (0.493) 0.564 (0.333) 
High 0.461 (0.344) 0.224 (0.449) 0.492 (0.340) 
Political interest -0.045 (0.060) -0.057 (0.062) -0.048 (0.060) 
Political knowledge -0.101 (0.441) 0.053 (0.609) -0.013 (0.439) 
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Intercept -2.457 (0.772)*** -2.926 (0.930)** -2.224 (0.762)** 
N 439 326 439 
Pseudo-R² 20,50% 19,91% 20,17% 
Source: PartiRep Election Study 2009 and PartiRep Election Study 2014. 438 
Notes: Logistic regression with split-ticket voting as dependent variable. The results are weighted for age, gender 439 
and education level. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. + As in 2014 party preference was not asked for the regional 440 
elections in wave 1, the actual vote in the 2014 regional elections is compared to respondents’ preference for the 441 
federal elections in wave 1. 442 
5. Discussion 443 
Due to the differences between the context in which the 2014 and the 2009 EP elections took place, vote motives 444 
pertaining to both elections were expected to differ. More precisely, this article argued that European 445 
considerations should have mattered more in vote choices in 2014 and that this should be visible through increased 446 
levels of split-ticket voting. In the Belgian case, voters casted their vote for regional and EP elections on the same 447 
day. Hence, voters had the same attitudes and perceptions about the political and social situation in general when 448 
casting their different votes. We therefore tried to explain why voters did vote for a different party in the two ballots 449 
under scrutiny: the regional and the European ones. The results of our analyses show that the strength of 450 
respondents’ European identity and their support for EU integration significantly explain split-ticket voting in the 451 
Flemish sample in 2009, but not in the 2014 or in the Walloon samples. Rather, uncertainty about the most favoured 452 
party (which is often the result of holding multiple party preferences or of having a weaker party identification) and 453 
voting for a specific candidate in EP elections proved to be the most robust explanation for split-ticket voting in both 454 
regions of Belgium and in both elections accounted for in this study. Uncertainty appears in line with classical de-455 
alignment-based explanations of ticket-splitting, rather than as a change because of the specific context in which the 456 
2014 EP elections took place. Voting for a specific candidate, also largely corroborates classical explanations of 457 
ticket-splitting, especially when considering the increasingly candidate-centred nature of the political system. Also, 458 
one could add that the structure of the ballot in Belgium (semi-opened lists), whereby the head of list is often meant 459 
to ‘pull the list’. As a result, to a large extent, logics pertaining to the national political context and party system have 460 
prevailed. Yet, emitting a preference vote for one (or several) candidate(s) can be driven by characteristics of the 461 
candidate(s) that remain linked to national-level considerations (e.g. when a candidate has had an important role at 462 
the national or sub-national level before), or may be driven by European-level considerations (e.g. in cases when the 463 
candidate has a pronounced and visible opinion about EU policies and/or integration). While such differentiation 464 
remains difficult to interpret in 2009, the analyses demonstrated that in 2014 a candidate effect could be attributed 465 
to the specific presence on the lists of Guy Verhofstadt.  466 
 467 
Our data provides mixed evidence for the claim that the 2014 EP elections were more dominated by European vote 468 
motives than previous EP elections. Both the financial crisis and the politicization of the EU have seemingly had a 469 
very limited effect on vote choices. The introduction of Spitzenkandidaten is, however, a notable exception and does 470 
seem to have had a direct effect. When Flemish voters switched to the liberal party for European elections, they 471 
were likely to tick the name of Verhofstadt. When voters could only indirectly support Verhofstadt’s candidacy  (as in 472 
Wallonia), no effect was found. This appears in line with the findings of Hobolt (2014) who observed that in member 473 
states which are the home country of one or more of the Spitzenkandidaten, more citizens were aware of the link 474 
between their vote and the selection of a new President of the European Commission. Our research adds to these 475 
observations that such a ‘Spitzenkandidat effect’ has an impact on voting. Moreover, the presence of a direct effect 476 
while an indirect seems to be absent pleas in favour of the idea of direct elections for the President of the European 477 
Commission as one reaction to weak interest in EP elections among lay citizens. Furthermore, our research shows 478 
how the differentiation between national and European vote motives is increasingly difficult to make. European 479 
elections in Flanders have at least to some extent been about a national personality as denounced by the 480 
‘democratic deficit’ literature (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006), while being at the same time about a major European figure. 481 
Critics of the second-order model have maybe been too quick in dismissing its central postulate. In the end, the issue 482 
is not so much about whether European vote motives matter in European elections but also about how they may 483 
combine with national ones.  484 
 485 
The specificities of the Belgian case have hence largely allowed us to reconsider and further test the second-order 486 
model in the case of simultaneous elections. According to the Belgian Constitution following the Sixth State Reform, 487 
the federal elections should always be organised the same day as the European elections. Since their introduction, 488 
the regional elections have also been traditionally organised concomitantly with the European ballot. Although the 489 
 Politics and Governance, Year, Volume X, Issue X, Pages X–X 14 
regions do possess some leeway in adjusting the length of their legislatures and the date of elections, the Belgian 490 
case is likely to increasingly provide a prolific field of research for split-ticket voting in the future.  491 
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